Introduction
Recently, the US military has been in engaged in counterinsurgency operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief missions, and building partnership capacity, not Major Combat Operations. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, these trends will continue as emphasized by the six key missions, of which only one represents Major Combat Operations. 1 However, US military forces are still organized to fight attrition style warfare.
Why? According to Title 10 of the United States Code, the Services bare the responsibility to organize, equip, and train forces. The Services have attempted to transform but there has been limited emphasis on organizational change beyond the presentation of forces. Therefore, the Services, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), and Joint Task Forces (JTF) must organize properly.
Since the earliest recorded history, successful military generals have surrounded themselves with advisors, soothsayers and sages to varying degrees of success. This paper presents the historical foundations of the Joint staff structure in order to understand current organizational proclivities. It explains organizational theory and proposes a theoretical model for staff organization, based not only on historical military organizational principles, but also on organizational theory principles. The analysis reveals the importance of organizational flexibility -a significant change from current doctrinal staff organization. Staffs have evolved into "an allcontrolling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner." 2 They restrain rather than free the commander to, quite simply, command.
The following discussion focuses on how the legacy of Franco-Prussian military structures influence current organizational designs and how organizational theory principles can enable Joint Task Forces (JTF) of the future to effectively navigate the evolving geopolitical environment. This paper definitively shows how a more efficiently structured JTF staff can be designed to meet the operational level demands of counterinsurgencies by using organizational theory and operational design principles. There are some discrepancies between the Services and academics as to the definition of operational design. Therefore, operational design will be The information technology (IT) revolution has not been thoroughly utilized in military organizational transformation -we continue to employ the same antiquated Napoleonic staff structure supplemented with a Prussian Chief of Staff protocol in order to command and control.
Just as the Generals in World War I failed to adapt infantry tactics to meet the weapon systems technological revolution, so too has our command and control organizational structure not adapted to meet the realities of counterinsurgencies. The US military, more specifically JFCs, must create an agile organization grounded in organizational theory and operational design concepts, enabled by current and future IT solutions, in order to rapidly adapt to fluid, full spectrum operations.
JTFs are created and employed to conduct contingency operations; yet, our personnel system remains rooted in the Napoleonic structure. Both technology and our enemies continuously evolve; yet, our bureaucratic structure has been slow to embrace change. Further, Chaplains, a chief of Engineers, and a chief of Artillery. They also retained their authority as chiefs of their respective branches while simultaneously serving as his principle staff officers.
King Adolphus also developed the basic system of Courts-Martial and military law still in use today. His concepts were so influential that European leaders patterned their armies after his method for 300 years posthumous. Oliver Cromwell provided the next significant addition by adding a commissary general, ensuring all were paid for their services. 8 This was a novel concept at the time and underpinned his philosophy of command and egalitarian ideals.
French and Prussian Influence
The Napoleonic revolution followed with the levee en masse. Napoleon failed to utilize a general staff, preferring his own council to that of any advisors, which debilitated his staff.
Nevertheless, the writings of Napoleon' 
US Influence
The US military J-staff adaptation has roots in these European concepts, but it was not adopted whole-heartedly. General Von Steuben introduced the Prussian Staff System to the Continental Army under George Washington; however Congress did not authorize the General Staff System as Washington recommended. As a result, the Continental Army remained poorly staffed and organized for over 100 years. It was not until after the America's performance in the Spanish-American War that Congress would authorize the establishment of a general staff. The spark to this tinderbox was a comment attributed to "the then commissary general to the effect that his office was running perfectly until the war disrupted and disorganized it." investigates the impact that individuals, groups, and structure have on behavior within organizations, for the purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving an organization's effectiveness." 15 OB is a systematic examination of relationships through the behavioral sciences psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Each discipline contributes to the study of OB through varying units of analysis from the individual layer to the entire organizational system respectively. As such, this section focuses on three sub-divisions of organizational behavior: organizational culture, structure, and design.
Organizational Culture
What is organizational culture and why is it important to JTFs? First, let's work through the definitions. A widely accepted definition of an organization is a "consciously coordinated social unit, composed of two or more people, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals." 16 Organizations have a management structure serving a multitude of purposes including the determination of relationships between functions and positions as well as delegating authority, roles, and responsibilities for defined tasks. Most importantly, some level of individual control becomes the foundational principle of organizations. Therefore, organizations are groups of people, which exist to solve problems and complete tasks through structured relationships.
There are a plethora of culture definitions from sources throughout the social sciences;
however, most bare a similarity to the definition espoused by Edgar Schein, Professor Emeritus at the MIT Sloan School of Management and prominent organizational culture expert. Schein defines culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." 17 Organizations become incredibly comfortable with others who share their same set of truths and very uncomfortable in situations where different assumptions operate -because of our own cognitive biases -thus making organizational change an anxiety producer. 24 To truly decipher an organization's culture, one must fully understand the basic assumptions as they are inextricably linked to its beliefs, values, and artifacts. As Schein states, "the essence of a group's culture is its pattern of shared, basic taken-for-granted assumptions, the culture will manifest itself at the level of observable artifacts and shared espoused values, norms, and rules of behavior."
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Organizational Structure
The first step of establishing an effective organizational structure is to have a thorough understanding of an organization's cultural artifacts, values, and assumptions. Cultural aspects lay the foundation for effective and efficient organizations; however, organizational structures can, and will, shape attitudes and behaviors. Robbins and Judge describe organizational structure as "how job tasks are formally divided, grouped, and coordinated." 26 They posit six key elements of organizational structure: work specialization, departmentalization, chain of command, span of control, centralization and decentralization, and formalization. 27 Work specialization, or division of labor, refers to the degree to which activities or tasks in the organization are divided into separate jobs. Job specialization produces subject matter experts as well as increases efficiency by encouraging the development of specialized tools. The cons of dividing work into smaller parts are losing the "forest in the trees" and the higher "transaction costs" when transferring work from one specialist to the next. Alternatives to work specialization include rotating personnel through jobs, adding responsibilities, or empowering people to perform with more discretion.
Once the division of labor is established, jobs are organized into meaningful categories through the process of departmentalization. This grouping permits coordination and integration of common tasks. Examples include but are not limited to functional and geographic groupings.
Functional departmentalization arranges activities by function performed, allowing for increased specialization and seeking to achieve economies of scale by placing people with common skills and orientations into common units. Geographic departmentalization organizes activities via territory. Departmentalization is important; nonetheless, "rigid, functional departmentalization is being increasingly complemented by teams that cross over traditional departmental lines." 28 Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate that exercises command or "is an unbroken line of authority that extends from the top of the organization to the lowest echelon and clarifies who reports to whom." 29, 30 The last key element of organizational structure is formalization. This concept refers to the degree to which jobs within the organization are standardized. 34 Highly standardized jobs and organizations produce consistent and homogeneous outputs. Further, these organizations prescribe clearly articulated procedures and processes, alleviating employees from engaging in alternative behaviors and potentially decreasing employee creativity.
Organizational Design
Given the key elements of organizational structure and the aspects of organizational culture, commanders and leaders can embark on designing their organizations. First, why are there different structures and designs for organizations? Many factors influence those decisions, but quite simply, one size does not fit all. What works for General Electric and Zappos, may not work for the US military. Each organization is shaped differently by their respective environments; differ in size, technology, and most importantly through their own organizational strategies. Simply stated, design and structure exist to help organizations achieve their goals, which should be directly linked to their strategic end state that is influenced by individual differences and cultural beliefs, norms, and assumptions.
Setting the left and right bounds of design, are the mechanistic and the organic models.
The mechanistic model is characterized by a substantial structure, high formalization and specialization, rigid departmentalization, clear chain of command, narrow spans of control, and is extremely centralized. 35 Examples of the mechanistic model are the Internal Revenue Service and the US military. The organic model, is exactly opposite of the mechanistic, and is a flat organization characterized by cross-functional and cross-hierarchical teams, free flows of information, low formalization, and wide spans of control.
Organizational design is simply the creation or change of an organization's structure.
Focusing on four design structures: simple, bureaucratic, team, and matrix allows for a wide breadth of organizational possibilities while simultaneously showing how organizations can and should integrate mechanistic and organic models in order to achieve strategic ends. The simple structure is "characterized by a low degree of departmentalization, wide spans of control, centralized authority in a single person, and little formalization." 36 The simple structure is ideal for small organizations because it is extremely fast, flexible, and flat, allowing for rapid decisions. As organizations grow, the low formalization and centralized authority yield to information overload at the top.
The bureaucracy follows the mechanistic model almost to the letter, grouping personnel into like divisions based on similar activities, expertise, skill, and resources. The bureaucratic design is characterized by "highly routine operating tasks achieved through specialization, very formalized rules and regulations, tasks that are grouped into functional departments, centralized authority, narrow spans of control, and decision making that follows the chain of command." 37 Inefficiencies arise when personnel encounter problems for which no pre-programmed decision support templates have already been established. Further, personnel obsess over rules and regulations and therefore may lack the acumen to find innovative ways of dealing with problems.
Since bureaucracies have extremely formalized rules and regulations, they can get by with lackluster performance from mid and lower level leadership positions. However, the major strength of the bureaucracy is its ability to efficiently perform standardized operations. Would you really want an organic structure collecting your taxes or building your vehicle?
The team structure primarily organizes around ad-hoc or permanent cross-functional teams composed of personnel from different departments, but similar hierarchical locations, who work together to solve problems. The primary characteristics of the team design are that "it breaks down departmental barriers and decentralizes decision making." 38 The Joint Planning Group (JPG) is an example of a cross-functional team without the decentralized decisionmaking. As Robbins suggests, before embarking on a team structure, designers should ask themselves a few questions: (1) can the work be done better by one person; (2) does the work create a common purpose greater than the aggregate goals; (3) are the members of the group interdependent? 39 If the answers to these questions are affirmative, then the team structure should be combined with or supplant the current organizational design. Simply, the benefit of using teams must exceed the costs. If teams are to be utilized, implementation of some sort of 360-degree evaluations should be adopted in order to alleviate individual competitiveness. planning teams" and they can be either temporary or enduring depending upon the problem they are created to manage. 41 These entities "facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by the HQ." 42 While these teams are cross-functional in their processes, they usually remain assigned to their functional staff directorates. Several Combatant Commands implement what they term "functional organization" structures, organizing the staff by other than the traditional J-code functional organization. The intent of this organizational structure is to promote close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The reason for this adaptation is the provision of a more conducive atmosphere for unity of effort (coalition and whole of government) and a better focus on key mission areas such as Security Cooperation.
Conceptually, JP 3-33 posits that "when brought together in a cohesive organization such as a JTF headquarters, B2C2WG's enhance collective staff understanding, facilitate more effective planning and enhance critical decision-making" -allegedly strengthening the staff's analytical process and improving the commander's decision-making ability. 43 In practice however, it typically falls short. Unfortunately, these "types of organizations experience several 'growing' challenges: confusion in delineating respective counterparts in other 'J-code' military headquarters; education and training of incoming staff personnel; different, unforeseen 'seams' that may require Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups." 44 There remains a "continuing challenge in the staffs on balancing the potentially large number of B2C2WGs necessary for full staff analysis and integration with the limited number of personnel on the staff, time available, and other competing scheduling requirements for the principals and leaders." 
Recommendations
There are four recommendations requiring further research and development to ameliorate the uncovered issues. First, there is a significant gap in Joint Doctrine regarding the headquarters organization for employment and the deliberation and timing of that decision, which must be repaired. Nothing currently exists in Joint Doctrine questioning the staff organization during the JOPP process. JP 3-33 speaks to some aspects of Joint headquarters organization, but it is divorced from the planning process and is often executed on an ad hoc process devoid of the requisite deliberate decisions necessary to succeed in complex, illstructured environs. Unfortunately, old habits die hard as evidence by the writings of GEN (ret)
Luck when he stated in a 2008 publication, "we still find the J-code structure as the preferred basic staff structure, particularly at the JTF level. It provides a common reference point on where expertise, staff oversight, (e.g. intelligence or logistics) and accountability exists on the staff, allows for easy cross talk with external organizations, and effectively supports other staff integrating structures such as functional boards, cells, and working groups B2C2WGs." 50 Operational design must include an analysis and recommendation for core staff organization, based on the cognitive map, and question fundamental staff organizational assumptions.
A step must be included in the operational design process, which forces the staff to critically organize a B2C2WG-like process and develops the necessary staff organization to implement and successfully prosecute the LOOs developed. While some staff organization may be operational art, the majority of the function Battle Rhythm organization for decisions and the root structure of the staff -whether a historical J model, or a functional one, logic should drive the process rather than a "react to contact" or improvised implementation.
Second, the personnel management system must fully embrace the idea of a hybrid organization; possibly changing not only organizational structures, but also the entire accessions and Joint Professional Military Education process. An adoption of a truly matrix organization requires robust personnel system changes. The process for evaluation reports, rating schemes, promotions, awards, etc. all derives from an MCO, attrition based replacement model. Given the potential nature of future conflicts and the changing geopolitical landscape; the personnel system must adapt and change to meet the needs of this complex environment -business as usual will not suffice. While beyond the scope of this paper, we recommend that further research be conducted to determine the most efficient and effective way to restructure the entire military personnel system -using an operational design approach toward determining true requirements and not just placating entrenched bureaucracies.
Third, an early adoption of the whole of government approach must occur during the very earliest phases of planning. Assuming that the US military will operate in a joint, interagency, multinational environment; Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) should strive to permanently establish other governmental agency, nongovernmental agency, and coalition partner representatives to JPGs full-time and not just on an ad hoc basis as contingencies develop. If GCCs cannot establish permanent LOO teams or decide to exercise their prerogative, they should realize that a whole of government approach is required during Phase 0 and Phase I. Entities such as DARPA do an amazing job of researching, developing, and implementing new
technologies. Yet, there is a distinct lack of research into the human terrain. The US government should collaborate with civilian institutions for policy, peace, conflict resolution, and
International Relations to ensure that the lessons learned can be translated into policy and action;
ensuring we solve the right problems, and not unintentionally create even worse second and third order effects.
Conclusion
Over the past 20 years, the US military has primarily been engaged in missions that span the full spectrum of conflict with minor excursions into Major Combat Operations. This trend seems to be continuing based on the current and predicted geopolitical environment. However, US military forces are still stuck with an antiquated organizational structure based on tradition, not innovative best practices from industry. While not all organizational designs are best suited for the US military, a matrix organization consisting of functional departments and permanent cross-functional LOO teams appears to work, and the question of appropriate organizational structure must be a part of the operational design process for the JTF Commander and staff.
